An update on the arrest of Abu Bakar Bashir and the what it says about the state of Jemaah Islamiyah

Despite an online petition drive and pressure campaign to release militant cleric Abu Bakar Bashir, both the evidence against him and the Indonesian authorities' confidence in prosecuting him are greater than the two other times he was arrested. For an analysis of the case against Bashir and what the recent investigations tell us about the state of Jemaah Islamiyah, please see my recent article "Fall of the Teflon Terrorist?" in the Australia/Israel Review.

The Insurgency in Southern Thailand is All But Lost

Thai authorities announced yesterday that Santisuk Promdao, the police monkey who had been charming insurgents in Pattani's Sai Buri district  into obsequious surrender had been killed by a pack of dogs.  


The Law Enforcement Macaque (LEM) was laid to rest in his uniform with full service honors.  That brings the tally of 13 policemen killed in the insurgency in 2010, though he was the first LEM killed to date.  Police are investigating the three dogs' motives and whether there is any connection to the insurgents.  


Authorities expressed pessimism that the recent decline in violence would be sustained with the LEM's passing and were expecting a post Ramadan spike in violence.


In other news, two people were killed and five were wounded in the evening of 22-23 August.  But still, few seem to care about the insurgency that shows no signs of abating.

Finally a Productive Use of Chinese T-69 Tanks!

The Thai government has finally found a use for the T-69 tanks it purchased from China.  This week they dumped 25 of the 95 tanks into the Gulf of Siam, off Narathiwat province near the Malaysian border, to form an artificial reef.  Riddled with defects, the tanks were little use to the Royal Thai Army. They saw more service in the 2006 coup than they did in battle.  Perhaps the fish and other reef dwellers won’t be so discerning about shoddy Chinese armored vehicles.  They’re sure to use them more productively than the Thai military ever did.

Update on Southern Thailand

Last week, four bombs went off in southern Thailand, killing 10, including four soldiers and four paramilitaries. An additional four people were gunned down. Pundits decry the 88 killed in the Red Shirt demonstrations in Bangkok in May, yet more than 4,100 people have been killed, and nearly 7,000 wounded since the insurgency in southern Thailand began in January 2004; 160 have been killed and over 400 wounded in 2010 alone. Yet the conflict gets little attention in this Bangkok-centric nation, obsessed with the elite’s political machinations, despite the Bt 3 billion ($91 million) a year spent on curbing it.

The administration of Abhisit Vejjajiva pledged to resolve the crisis in the south when it came to power in December 2008. The south has long been the Democrat Party’s heartland, and they believed they had a softer and more nuanced approach. But the government soon became embroiled in a popular uprising over how it came to power and the south became a low priority.

Nonetheless, in the 18 months since the Abhisit administration has been in office, violence has come down. An average of 32 people a month are being killed, while 66 are wounded. In 2007, the peak of the violence, 4 people a day were being killed and 8 were being wounded. In the first half of 2010, the ratio was down to just under 24.3 people a month being killed and 67 wounded.

Trends in Casualties

Soldiers: Large numbers of soldiers are wounded though few are killed. In the past 18 months, 37 have been killed and 308 wounded. This is the result of improved force protection, battlefield medicine/clotting kits, larger patrol sizes that deter insurgents, and the fact that all soldiers in the field wear kevlar vests and helmets. Most of the soldiers who are wounded are victims of IEDs while on teacher protection details, which take them to remote villages. Teacher protection units are the primary IED target of the insurgents today.

Police: Police casualties are steady, though not as high as one would expect. 34 police have been killed in the past 18 months, but 158 wounded. You see police less in the countryside, with the exception of checkpoints on roads. Police usually - but not always - weak kevlar vests, but wear no helmets. The one exception to this is at a handful of checkpoints at night, when they wear both. They do not have the same battlefield medical training. Police drive thin-skinned pickup trucks, though they have increased the number with steel plating. In some, they have increased the plating up an additional 2-3 feet. Police do not take force protection seriously.

Rangers and VDVs: Together, 67 have been killed and 103 wounded. Village Defense Volunteers live in the villages and are very vulnerable to attacks. They are armed with shotguns. VDVs often go on teacher protection duty, where they are killed or wounded in IED attacks. The number of armed villagers is up sharply, with the government having received large shipments of shotguns.

The press often reports Rangers to be “army rangers.” They are not part of the army. The Rangers are poorly trained paramilitaries (tahanpran). They are less restrained in their targeting, often engage in EJKs and other human rights abuses, and as such, incur the wrath of the militants. Their weapons are all de-commissioned army guns that often jam or need servicing. They travel often loaded into pickup trucks. Rangers wear no body armor of kevlar helmets. Few have any medical training. Ranger casualties are on the rise and everyone on the ground seems to view them as expendable.

H
eadmen: In the past 18 months, over 60 headmen have been killed but under 10 were wounded, as they are often so remote, that they die before they can receive medical attention. Headmen remain one of the most common targets for insurgents because they are the front line of the Thai state and are perceived as collaborators. Casualty rates are on the rise. Hey, all politics are local.

Teachers: Since the insurgency began, more than 125 teachers have been killed, making them a priority target for the insurgents. Only 13 were killed and 8 wounded in the past 18 months, a sharp decrease. Yet, 9 of those 13 were killed in one single month, June 2009. Thai schools begin in June, and as such, the militants wanted to really send a message. The explanations for the overall decline in teacher casualties are varied. On the one hand, the security forces have dramatically increased the size and number of teacher protection patrols. Soldiers were all over the place when schools were getting out. There is also a permanent military presence at many schools – certainly in the larger towns and along the major highways. Not huge, but enough to deter. But it also appears to be as a result of the backlash from their own Muslim constituency. The feeling, as one person told me, is “better to have Siamese schools than no schools at all.”

Monks: Only one monk was killed in an IED attack while collecting alms. Authorities think this is significant because previous attacks on monks led to retaliatory attacks on Muslim clerics and teachers, threatening a broader sectarian escalation.

Sectarian Issues: Between January 2004 and December 2009, the majority of those killed were Muslim (2,337 compared to 1,607). The ratio is inverse regarding the wounded; 4,207 Buddhists were wounded compared to 2,389 Muslims). What troubles authorities (all Buddhists that I spoke to), however, is that Buddhists only make up 15 percent of the population in the south. The majority of Buddhists live in large towns. Those who have remained in the countryside, live in heavily armed Buddhist enclaves. Though some 20 percent of the Buddhist community fled in 2004-206, the flood has stopped.

Trends in Attacks

Bombings: Although bombings are down, from the peak of 2007, there were still over 230 bombings in the 18 months since Abhisit came to power, an average of over 12 per month. In the first six months of 2010, there have roughly 80 bombings, so the rate is lower, still. There have been several large bombings, including three car bombs. 5-20 KG is the norm. Most bombs are made out of cooking gar/propane canisters or fire extinguishers filled with ammonium nitrate; i.e. things that can be procured easily and often for free. There have been a number of motorcycle bombs in markets, which authorities are trying to thwart by asking people to raise their motorcycle seats when they park people still resist this because it is the “storage” on a motorcycle, but I did see a handful of markets in Narathiwat where this was required. Though insurgents still deploy time-delayed bombs to target security forces, they do so less frequently. Multiple/simultaneous bombings are also down.

Overall, there are fewer indiscriminate bombings of soft targets and a greater focus on hitting security forces in remote areas. This jibes with the pattern of assassinations. Overall violence is less indiscriminate. Targeting today is much more focused and retaliatory in nature.

In the past 18 months there were 30 cases in which bombs were discovered and defused or failed to go off. There have been come grenade attacks, such as the incident where insurgents lobbed a grenade into a police compound as they were lining up for roll call, killing 2 and wounding 42. Insurgents have used grenades only 26 times in the past 18 months. The primary reason for this is that the insurgents do not have a supply of grenades and few Thai soldiers are even deployed with them, making capture less likely. Yet, when they have them, they use them, as seen in the trend since February 2010.

Shootings: Still, the largest category of casualties comes from shootings. Usually conducted by pillion riders.

The pattern of killings seems far more calculated then it ever has. A real pattern of tit-for-tat attacks has developed. Killings that are simply meant to terrorize are down. Most of the Muslim-on-Muslim violence was always about power, and it still is. The militants succeeded in driving some Buddhists out of the countryside, but they are unlikely to drive much more. A locally based Muslim journalist argues that there have been a number of gentlemen’s agreement concerning an end of EJKs in return for a cease of soft target bombings.

Arson Attacks: Arson attacks on schools are down dramatically. Only 12 schools were arsoned between January 2009 and May 2010. There are several reasons for this. First, there is a permanent military presence at many schools – certainly in the larger towns and along the major highways. Second, many of the old wooden schools are now concrete structures: there is nothing to torch. And third, as mentioned above, there has been a backlash from their own Muslim constituency who want their children in school, any school. Other arson attacks, such as on government buildings are down.

Beheadings and Desecrations: There have been 11 beheadings since January 2009, though there have been none in 2010. Overall, since January 2004, there have been roughly 40 beheadings. Militants have desecrated the bodies of 26 victims; usually setting their corpses on fire.

Other: Attacks on railroads, cell phone and power-transmission lines are all down markedly from their peak in 2007. Five cell phone and electric towers were arsoned or bombed in one night in June 2009, but such attacks have really diminished.

Improvements in the Thai Security Forces

Since violence peaked in mid—2007, the RTA has had a “surge” in the south. There are over 60,000 security forces deployed in the three provinces, including 30,000 soldiers, 10,000 Rangers and 20,000 police and other MOI and intelligence personnel. During the day, there are visibly more troops on the road. It is probably the right amount of troops as the place does not feel like it is under occupation, but there are significantly more troops deployed then there were two years ago.

But more than just quantity, the quality of Thai troops is better. They deserve credit for a few things.

1. They have not over-reacted to any event recently, indeed they have been quite restrained.

2. The Keystone Cop stuff of 2007, i.e., when top militants were allowed to slip out of chicken wire holding cells seems to be the stuff of the past. They’re not screwing up the way they used to.

3. They are really ticked off about the vigilante stuff. The RTA leaked the photo of the Mosque massacre subject when Queens Guards got him released. Another suspect whose photo was leaked topped himself. RTA really seems to be cracking down on Buddhist vigilantes.

They may not have raised the ceiling, but the floor is no longer dropping.

Trends in Arrests/Neutralization of Insurgents

The number of militants killed and captured in the past 18 months is actually down, though counter-intuitively, that might be a good thing. 47 militants were killed and 124 captured.

Breaking the Vicious Cycle: In 2007, the army began mass detentions of suspects. By the end of the year more than 2000 had been detained. Under the emergency decree, suspects could be held 28 days without charge, when they had to be either charged or freed. Yet the police either were unable to gather evidence or no one would cooperate with them. The courts ordered the release of over 90 percent of the detainees. This of course, infuriated the army, which both lessened their already questionable willingness to work with the police and encouraged them to engaged in EJKs. The military got in trouble by holding detainees longer than 28 days by enrolling them in mandatory vocational training programs, etc. Many of the detainees were held 12-18 months without ever being charged. The result of this is that if the young men weren’t insurgents before they were arrested, they were afterwards.

The decline in arrests makes me hopeful in that it may portend that the military is no longer engaging in broad sweeps that were so counter-productive. 4^th Army officials admit that these sweeps were counter-productive. The last time they made a mass arrest was October 2009, when they raided the Saengtham Wittaya School in Narathiwat’s Bacho district, detaining 60 students and religious teachers for questioning, only one person had an indictment.

Moreover, if one follows the day-to-day press reports, it appears that intelligence is getting better and that when an incident happens, the military or police have a much more specific idea of who was behind the attack, one to two people are identified and sought after. Then again, their intel could only improve.

Moreover, the governor of Yala has implemented a pilot program that makes a lot of sense to me. Most of the detainees are held on very flimsy charges. He has been arranging for bail, placing the young men under the recognizance of village headmen and religious leaders, while awaiting their trials, if charges are indeed pressed. This really deserves a closer look.

Negotiations

The government has been involved in some indirect talks with the insurgents including BRN-C, BRN-K, PULO, GMIP, and BIPP.

The BRN-C has been reluctant to attend. They just are not there yet. Other than GMIP, all want to be there because their presence leverages the fact that they have no other influence. The real problem they have is generational. If they negotiate they have to bring the guys in the field to the table and there is little belief that they can deliver. There are roughly 25-30 field commanders, who have multiple cells reporting to them. The Malaysian-based leaders have little to nothing to offer the field commanders. They converse, but they do not command. They do not have financial leverage over them. Finally, they cannot deliver anything (i.e. the government arresting the rest of the Mosque-massacre suspects). I did not meet one person who thought that negotiations would be successful and would lead to an end to the violence.

None of the RTA officers that I spoke to believe that negotiations will end the violence.

And there is still a question as to why the militants on the ground have any reason to negotiate. They are not winning, but they are also not losing, which in an insurgency, is often enough. They are achieving their short-term objectives. But A) what is on the table from the government and B) why would they implement any promise now, having failed repeatedly in the past? The reality is Bangkok cannot solve the south’s problems until it solves its own problems.

Development Funds

There is absolute consensus that the Bt63 billion in development funding is going to exacerbate the problem, not solve it. The real questions are who will spend those funds and how they will be spent? As it stands now, the military’s Internal Security Operations Command will be responsible for the disbursement of most of the funds. The civilian-led Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre only administers a handful of projects for education and reconciliation. In short the government said that it wants a softer more-development oriented approach, but that policy is being administered by the same institution that the government seeks to diminish.

Everyone I spoke to warned that the influx might actually have the adverse effect. If funds are misappropriated – and the will be – or directed to Buddhists or Muslims that have openly sided with the government, it will further alienate the population. Since 2004, the government has gone out of its way to fiscally punish “red zones” – villages with high rates of insurgent activity; hardly an effective counter-insurgency program.

More cynically, the funds are being used to shore up the Democrat’s base. Though the south is their heartland, it is really the upper south. They have been losing their share of the vote since 1996, especially in the three Muslim provinces. With elections that must be held in 2011, and the democrats likely to suffer in the north and northeast despite a slew of populist policies, dominating the south is a priority.

Getting the Moro House in Order?

On 20 May 2010, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) penned a coordination agreement under the auspices of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Tajikistan. This agreement, which was signed by MILF Chairman Ebrahim el-Haj Murad and the MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari, is at the same time, symbolic, legally important, and problematic.

Symbolically, it is important because the two groups loathe each other. They split in 1978, though the MILF was not formally formed until 1984. The MILF sees the MNLF as a bunch of debauched apostates who sold out for a failed peace agreement with the government in 1996. The MNLF have failed to come to terms that the MILF is a separate entity that is larger, more powerful and could potentially win more at the negotiating table. The MNLF has – in essence – become a Tausig organization with limited presence in the Maranao and Maguindanao heartland, while the MILF’s presence in the Sulu archipelago is spotty and on the Island of Basilan especially troubling as they are oftentimes indistinguishable from the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

But the agreement is troubling because not all regard Nur Misuari, the MNLF’s founder, as the legitimate MNLF chairman. After his failed governance from 1996-2001, he was ousted by the MNLF’s Executive Council, and replaced by Muslimin Semma. Misuari led a failed rebellion, fled to Malaysia, which quickly rendered him to the Philippines, where he languished in house arrest until a few years ago. Semma, though less charismatic than Misuari, is a competent administrator and deserves plaudits for running and growing Cotabato City so effectively. Misuari once told me that Semma “is a traitor who should be hung.” Then again, Misuari also talks about himself in the third person and includes himself in the great pantheon of revolutionary leaders (Che Guevara, Ho Chi Minh, you get the picture).

Semma’s faction of the MNLF, which is removed from the Tausig stronghold, has worked well with the MILF over the years. Misuari’s wing tends to embody Tausig chauvinism. But the MNLF has two distinct factions, which still needs to be addressed.

Nonetheless, the agreement has important ramifications for the government’s peace process with the MILF: The government’s 1996 peace accord with the MNLF created the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, which now include Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu, Tawi Tawi and most of Basilan. The MILF continued fighting for an independent state over a territory that included but was not limited to the ARMM. From 2003-2007, the government and MILF were in peace talks to establish an expanded autonomous region, known as the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE).

The sticking point was the size and the scope of the BJE. The MILF’s map included 3,978 barangays (villages) in addition to the ARMM, while the government said the Moro ancestral domain only included 613 barangays in addition to the ARMM. Finally in November 2007 the two sides reached a compromise and a draft agreement was signed.

Nonetheless, the security cluster in the President Arroyo’s cabinet, hardliners in the Congress, as well as many Christian leaders in Mindanao rejected the agreement. Moreover, the Supreme Court ruled the agreement unconstitutional, which led the MILF to take up arms once again. Low-level violence has continued since.

But here’s the rub: the MNLF has been vehemently against this agreement, which in effect would nullify their own 1996 autonomy accord. The MNLF insists upon talks with the government to redress what the government has failed to implement since 1996. The MNLF saw the creation of the BJE as patently illegal; and many Filipino leaders agreed with them. The MNLF called for Tripartite Talks, between themselves, the government and OIC to revisit the 1996 Tripoli Accord.

The 2007 draft accord with the MILF, called for ARMM officials to finish their terms, upon which the ARMM would be dissolved. The BJE’s government would be established over an enlarged territory. The draft accord did not outline how the BJE would establish its government. It left that decision – or indecision - to the bickering Moros. The MNLF assumed that the MILF would never relinquish control, and their concerns are founded.

In sum, for the government’s peace accord with the MILF to go forward, there has to be a strong working relationship between the two Moro groups and a shared acceptance of the BJE’s scope and governance. As the agreement said, coordination between the MILF and MNLF was “geared toward achieving the aspirations of the Bangsamoro people for genuine self-governance.”

This is not the first time that the two sides have tried to establish working relationship. Mutual suspicion, differing goals and egos always undermined attempts at coordination. But with a new administration, there is window of opportunity, at least in the eyes of the international community. As the MILF’s chief negotiation Mohagher Iqbal put it, the accord signals “that we are now in the right direction.”

We don’t know where the peace process is heading. Appalling little was said about the peace process by all candidates in this past May’s presidential election, least of all by the apparent winner, Benigno Aquino. We don’t know what policies his administration will put in place, nor the vigor in which he will pursue the peace process. A student of his mother’s presidency, Aquino will unlikely push for policies that antagonize the country’s politicized security forces. But he is an economic pragmatist who understands that the economy can ill-afford more war and further under-development in resource rich Mindanao.

While the Moros have plenty of grievances and mistrust towards government intentions is palpable, their inability to work together has played into the Philippine government’s traditional policy of divide and conquer. The Moros have to get their own house in order, before a durable political settlement can be reached. If properly implemented, and that’s a big if, the two sides can begin to forge a common negotiating framework.

Indonesian Counter-Terrorism: The Great Leap Forward

Too often the news surrounding terrorism is dominated by the headline-catching acts of terrorism, such as last summer’s twin suicide bombings in Jakarta, or the take-down of terrorist operatives such as Dr. Azahari bin Hussin or Noordin Mohammad Top. Less is written about success in counterterrorism operations. No country deserves more credit for improving its counterterrorism operations and capabilities than Indonesia. While terrorism will never be eliminated, Indonesia has developed a strong and effective counterterrorist force, while at the same time consolidating its democratic transition. There is no other country in the world that can make this claim.

For the rest of the article go to the Jamestown Foundation's website.

More Russian Arms to the Region

For a country with one of the lowest levels of spending on public health, and no shortage of public health woes, one always has to question the next big arms purchase of the Burmese generals ensconced in their testosterone lair of Naypyidaw. Today it was announced that the generals had purchased 20 MiG-29 jets for $575 million. Burma received their first 12 MiG-29 fighters in 2001.

This is the second recent large-scale sale of arms to Southeast Asia. In December 2009, Vietnam announced that it had purchased 6 Kilo class diesel-electric fast attack submarines and 12 SU-30MKK fighter jets from Russia. The deal was worth $1.8 billion and is the second largest sale of kilo-class submarines after the 2002 sale of eight of the vessels to China. Vietnam is already awaiting the delivery of 8 SU-30MKIIs, and announced the option to purchase another dozen. Vietnam also announced that Russia would help build its first nuclear power plant, estimated to go on line by 2020.

Vietnam is clearly worried about the resurgent Chinese push for sovereignty over the entire South China Sea.

Both countries have far more pressing socio-economic needs. But then again, at least the under-five mortality rate is 6.9 times less in Vietnam, than it is in Burma.

Holding Steady: No Improvements in Perceptions of Corruption in the Region

You have to hand it to the governments of Southeast Asia. Corruption might be a huge problem, but it continues to go un-addressed, despite foreign investor and popular dissatisfaction. Transparency International's perceptions of corruption index shows nearly flat line consistency across the region over the past 8 years. Only Indonesia has shown consistent, though small, gains.

Welcome to Yala Mr. Abhisit

It has now been one year since Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and the Democrat Party assumed power in Thailand. He promised to resolve the violence and search for a political solution for the Malay insurgency that has left more than 4,000 people dead since January 2004. Southern Thailand has been the scene of escalating violence that has led to de facto ethnic cleansing (15% of Buddhist population has fled) and the erosion of the social fabric of the southern Malay-majority provinces.

In the run up to last week's summit with Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak, Prime Minister Abhisit made several assertions: First, the violence has gone down in the South. This is not quite true. He cited the death toll from 2004 to its peak in 2007. Violence dropped precipitously in 2008, the year before he came to power. From 2004-06, the rate of violence was 1.5 people/day killed. At its peak, from September 2006 to July 2007, the average was 5 people per day killed. The violence dropped in 2008 to well under one person a day being killed.
But since 15 December 2008, when he became when the People's Power Party was ousted, and Abhisit became Prime Minister, violence has actually increased. Since 15 December 2008,1.2 people a day have been killed; well below the peak, but clearly an un-sustainable rate.
In the past year, based on my open-source statistics that are very conservative and tend to under-report the violence, some 429 people have been killed and 811 wounded. Those killed include 25 police, 35 soldiers and 26 paramilitary rangers. 303 civilians, 13 teachers, one monk and 26 village defense volunteers were also killed. In the past year, there have been 155 bombings, including 3 car bombs, and roughly 30 attempted bombings. There have been 11 beheadings and corpses have been burnt or desecrated 18 times. 10 schools were arsoned.





The 60,000 strong security forces are unable to defeat the insurgents who continue to be able to attack at will. While the arrest earlier this week of three Thai citizens in Malaysia, alleged bomb-makers, will help, the reality is few insurgents have been arrested and convicted.
Abhisit’s second was that there needs to be a durable political solution to the crisis. But his government has done little to achieve this. Indeed, the southern crisis has been an almost non-existent priority for a government that is singularly obsessed with former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The south has only become an issue, one year into his tenure, because of the fence-mending summit meeting with his Malaysian counterpart.
There has been no accountability of the security services, which still retain blanket immunity under the Thaksin-era emergency decree. This remains a major irritant of the Muslim community. The government has brought no security forces to justice, nor have they reined in unaccountable Buddhist militias, that often operate as vigilante squads. Government forces still engage in disappearances and EJKs.
Third, Abhisit asserted that the insurgents have no legitimacy. This is patently false and a sign of the government's denial. The insurgents are not loved. They are brutal- especially towards their own community. Over half of their victims have been their co-religionists, people they deem to be government collaborators, those who preach reconciliation with the Thai state, or those who denounce the insurgents' violence. The insurgents are more Islamist than the local population and are clearly implementing (slowly) their social agenda.
But to say that they have no legitimacy is incorrect. They are entrenched in their communities. Police and military get little assistance from the population. Most terrorism suspects are never charged. Indeed, at then end of the 30-day detention period, over 80 percent are freed. Few will cooperate with investigations or turn state's witness because the government does not offer an adequate amount of security. The population may not be 100 percent behind the insurgents, but they are also not supportive of the Thai state, which has been corrupt, abusive, engaged in systematic violations of human rights, favors the Buddhist community, and which does not provide adequate security. In sum, the insurgents are not doing a better job than the government in winning hearts and minds, but they are not doing worse, either. And in an insurgency, this is often enough.
While, there have been no bombings in the tourist venues of Phuket or Bangkok, I make the case that they do not have to. They are achieving their short-term goals:
1. Making the region ungovernable.
2. Eliminating potential local opposition
3. Destroying secular institutions and forcing people into parallel Islamist organization: in short imposing their social agenda on the population.
But it’s probably a matter of time. What happens in Yala, won’t always stay in Yala. The insurgents have the technical capacity and a demonstrated willingness to engage in mass casualty attacks, such as the 6 October 2009 car bombing of the Merlin Hotel in Narathiwat’s Sungai Golok.
But we should be concerned for a number of reasons: First, there is no end in sight. The government has made little headway in defeating the insurgents or winning back the hearts and minds of the local population. This remains the most lethal conflict in Southeast Asia. While we are inured by the violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, small conflicts left to fester do not benefit anyone’s security. Conflicts feed off another and become part of the jihadist narrative. Second, this is a lawless and ungoverned space in the heart of Southeast Asia.

How much is a life worth?

Well if you are a Uighur seeking asylum in Cambodia, it is $42.5 million dollars. Two days before the Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping arrived in Cambodia and signed 14 agreements that provided $850 million in grants and loans for infrastructure construction and development, the Cambodian government deported 20 Uighur asylum seekers to China. Both sides have been quick to assert that there was no quid pro quo, merely that they entered Cambodia without passports or visas. China is the largest investor and provider of aid to the human rights miasma that is Cambodia.