Update on Southern Thailand

Last week, four bombs went off in southern Thailand, killing 10, including four soldiers and four paramilitaries. An additional four people were gunned down. Pundits decry the 88 killed in the Red Shirt demonstrations in Bangkok in May, yet more than 4,100 people have been killed, and nearly 7,000 wounded since the insurgency in southern Thailand began in January 2004; 160 have been killed and over 400 wounded in 2010 alone. Yet the conflict gets little attention in this Bangkok-centric nation, obsessed with the elite’s political machinations, despite the Bt 3 billion ($91 million) a year spent on curbing it.

The administration of Abhisit Vejjajiva pledged to resolve the crisis in the south when it came to power in December 2008. The south has long been the Democrat Party’s heartland, and they believed they had a softer and more nuanced approach. But the government soon became embroiled in a popular uprising over how it came to power and the south became a low priority.

Nonetheless, in the 18 months since the Abhisit administration has been in office, violence has come down. An average of 32 people a month are being killed, while 66 are wounded. In 2007, the peak of the violence, 4 people a day were being killed and 8 were being wounded. In the first half of 2010, the ratio was down to just under 24.3 people a month being killed and 67 wounded.

Trends in Casualties

Soldiers: Large numbers of soldiers are wounded though few are killed. In the past 18 months, 37 have been killed and 308 wounded. This is the result of improved force protection, battlefield medicine/clotting kits, larger patrol sizes that deter insurgents, and the fact that all soldiers in the field wear kevlar vests and helmets. Most of the soldiers who are wounded are victims of IEDs while on teacher protection details, which take them to remote villages. Teacher protection units are the primary IED target of the insurgents today.

Police: Police casualties are steady, though not as high as one would expect. 34 police have been killed in the past 18 months, but 158 wounded. You see police less in the countryside, with the exception of checkpoints on roads. Police usually - but not always - weak kevlar vests, but wear no helmets. The one exception to this is at a handful of checkpoints at night, when they wear both. They do not have the same battlefield medical training. Police drive thin-skinned pickup trucks, though they have increased the number with steel plating. In some, they have increased the plating up an additional 2-3 feet. Police do not take force protection seriously.

Rangers and VDVs: Together, 67 have been killed and 103 wounded. Village Defense Volunteers live in the villages and are very vulnerable to attacks. They are armed with shotguns. VDVs often go on teacher protection duty, where they are killed or wounded in IED attacks. The number of armed villagers is up sharply, with the government having received large shipments of shotguns.

The press often reports Rangers to be “army rangers.” They are not part of the army. The Rangers are poorly trained paramilitaries (tahanpran). They are less restrained in their targeting, often engage in EJKs and other human rights abuses, and as such, incur the wrath of the militants. Their weapons are all de-commissioned army guns that often jam or need servicing. They travel often loaded into pickup trucks. Rangers wear no body armor of kevlar helmets. Few have any medical training. Ranger casualties are on the rise and everyone on the ground seems to view them as expendable.

H
eadmen: In the past 18 months, over 60 headmen have been killed but under 10 were wounded, as they are often so remote, that they die before they can receive medical attention. Headmen remain one of the most common targets for insurgents because they are the front line of the Thai state and are perceived as collaborators. Casualty rates are on the rise. Hey, all politics are local.

Teachers: Since the insurgency began, more than 125 teachers have been killed, making them a priority target for the insurgents. Only 13 were killed and 8 wounded in the past 18 months, a sharp decrease. Yet, 9 of those 13 were killed in one single month, June 2009. Thai schools begin in June, and as such, the militants wanted to really send a message. The explanations for the overall decline in teacher casualties are varied. On the one hand, the security forces have dramatically increased the size and number of teacher protection patrols. Soldiers were all over the place when schools were getting out. There is also a permanent military presence at many schools – certainly in the larger towns and along the major highways. Not huge, but enough to deter. But it also appears to be as a result of the backlash from their own Muslim constituency. The feeling, as one person told me, is “better to have Siamese schools than no schools at all.”

Monks: Only one monk was killed in an IED attack while collecting alms. Authorities think this is significant because previous attacks on monks led to retaliatory attacks on Muslim clerics and teachers, threatening a broader sectarian escalation.

Sectarian Issues: Between January 2004 and December 2009, the majority of those killed were Muslim (2,337 compared to 1,607). The ratio is inverse regarding the wounded; 4,207 Buddhists were wounded compared to 2,389 Muslims). What troubles authorities (all Buddhists that I spoke to), however, is that Buddhists only make up 15 percent of the population in the south. The majority of Buddhists live in large towns. Those who have remained in the countryside, live in heavily armed Buddhist enclaves. Though some 20 percent of the Buddhist community fled in 2004-206, the flood has stopped.

Trends in Attacks

Bombings: Although bombings are down, from the peak of 2007, there were still over 230 bombings in the 18 months since Abhisit came to power, an average of over 12 per month. In the first six months of 2010, there have roughly 80 bombings, so the rate is lower, still. There have been several large bombings, including three car bombs. 5-20 KG is the norm. Most bombs are made out of cooking gar/propane canisters or fire extinguishers filled with ammonium nitrate; i.e. things that can be procured easily and often for free. There have been a number of motorcycle bombs in markets, which authorities are trying to thwart by asking people to raise their motorcycle seats when they park people still resist this because it is the “storage” on a motorcycle, but I did see a handful of markets in Narathiwat where this was required. Though insurgents still deploy time-delayed bombs to target security forces, they do so less frequently. Multiple/simultaneous bombings are also down.

Overall, there are fewer indiscriminate bombings of soft targets and a greater focus on hitting security forces in remote areas. This jibes with the pattern of assassinations. Overall violence is less indiscriminate. Targeting today is much more focused and retaliatory in nature.

In the past 18 months there were 30 cases in which bombs were discovered and defused or failed to go off. There have been come grenade attacks, such as the incident where insurgents lobbed a grenade into a police compound as they were lining up for roll call, killing 2 and wounding 42. Insurgents have used grenades only 26 times in the past 18 months. The primary reason for this is that the insurgents do not have a supply of grenades and few Thai soldiers are even deployed with them, making capture less likely. Yet, when they have them, they use them, as seen in the trend since February 2010.

Shootings: Still, the largest category of casualties comes from shootings. Usually conducted by pillion riders.

The pattern of killings seems far more calculated then it ever has. A real pattern of tit-for-tat attacks has developed. Killings that are simply meant to terrorize are down. Most of the Muslim-on-Muslim violence was always about power, and it still is. The militants succeeded in driving some Buddhists out of the countryside, but they are unlikely to drive much more. A locally based Muslim journalist argues that there have been a number of gentlemen’s agreement concerning an end of EJKs in return for a cease of soft target bombings.

Arson Attacks: Arson attacks on schools are down dramatically. Only 12 schools were arsoned between January 2009 and May 2010. There are several reasons for this. First, there is a permanent military presence at many schools – certainly in the larger towns and along the major highways. Second, many of the old wooden schools are now concrete structures: there is nothing to torch. And third, as mentioned above, there has been a backlash from their own Muslim constituency who want their children in school, any school. Other arson attacks, such as on government buildings are down.

Beheadings and Desecrations: There have been 11 beheadings since January 2009, though there have been none in 2010. Overall, since January 2004, there have been roughly 40 beheadings. Militants have desecrated the bodies of 26 victims; usually setting their corpses on fire.

Other: Attacks on railroads, cell phone and power-transmission lines are all down markedly from their peak in 2007. Five cell phone and electric towers were arsoned or bombed in one night in June 2009, but such attacks have really diminished.

Improvements in the Thai Security Forces

Since violence peaked in mid—2007, the RTA has had a “surge” in the south. There are over 60,000 security forces deployed in the three provinces, including 30,000 soldiers, 10,000 Rangers and 20,000 police and other MOI and intelligence personnel. During the day, there are visibly more troops on the road. It is probably the right amount of troops as the place does not feel like it is under occupation, but there are significantly more troops deployed then there were two years ago.

But more than just quantity, the quality of Thai troops is better. They deserve credit for a few things.

1. They have not over-reacted to any event recently, indeed they have been quite restrained.

2. The Keystone Cop stuff of 2007, i.e., when top militants were allowed to slip out of chicken wire holding cells seems to be the stuff of the past. They’re not screwing up the way they used to.

3. They are really ticked off about the vigilante stuff. The RTA leaked the photo of the Mosque massacre subject when Queens Guards got him released. Another suspect whose photo was leaked topped himself. RTA really seems to be cracking down on Buddhist vigilantes.

They may not have raised the ceiling, but the floor is no longer dropping.

Trends in Arrests/Neutralization of Insurgents

The number of militants killed and captured in the past 18 months is actually down, though counter-intuitively, that might be a good thing. 47 militants were killed and 124 captured.

Breaking the Vicious Cycle: In 2007, the army began mass detentions of suspects. By the end of the year more than 2000 had been detained. Under the emergency decree, suspects could be held 28 days without charge, when they had to be either charged or freed. Yet the police either were unable to gather evidence or no one would cooperate with them. The courts ordered the release of over 90 percent of the detainees. This of course, infuriated the army, which both lessened their already questionable willingness to work with the police and encouraged them to engaged in EJKs. The military got in trouble by holding detainees longer than 28 days by enrolling them in mandatory vocational training programs, etc. Many of the detainees were held 12-18 months without ever being charged. The result of this is that if the young men weren’t insurgents before they were arrested, they were afterwards.

The decline in arrests makes me hopeful in that it may portend that the military is no longer engaging in broad sweeps that were so counter-productive. 4^th Army officials admit that these sweeps were counter-productive. The last time they made a mass arrest was October 2009, when they raided the Saengtham Wittaya School in Narathiwat’s Bacho district, detaining 60 students and religious teachers for questioning, only one person had an indictment.

Moreover, if one follows the day-to-day press reports, it appears that intelligence is getting better and that when an incident happens, the military or police have a much more specific idea of who was behind the attack, one to two people are identified and sought after. Then again, their intel could only improve.

Moreover, the governor of Yala has implemented a pilot program that makes a lot of sense to me. Most of the detainees are held on very flimsy charges. He has been arranging for bail, placing the young men under the recognizance of village headmen and religious leaders, while awaiting their trials, if charges are indeed pressed. This really deserves a closer look.

Negotiations

The government has been involved in some indirect talks with the insurgents including BRN-C, BRN-K, PULO, GMIP, and BIPP.

The BRN-C has been reluctant to attend. They just are not there yet. Other than GMIP, all want to be there because their presence leverages the fact that they have no other influence. The real problem they have is generational. If they negotiate they have to bring the guys in the field to the table and there is little belief that they can deliver. There are roughly 25-30 field commanders, who have multiple cells reporting to them. The Malaysian-based leaders have little to nothing to offer the field commanders. They converse, but they do not command. They do not have financial leverage over them. Finally, they cannot deliver anything (i.e. the government arresting the rest of the Mosque-massacre suspects). I did not meet one person who thought that negotiations would be successful and would lead to an end to the violence.

None of the RTA officers that I spoke to believe that negotiations will end the violence.

And there is still a question as to why the militants on the ground have any reason to negotiate. They are not winning, but they are also not losing, which in an insurgency, is often enough. They are achieving their short-term objectives. But A) what is on the table from the government and B) why would they implement any promise now, having failed repeatedly in the past? The reality is Bangkok cannot solve the south’s problems until it solves its own problems.

Development Funds

There is absolute consensus that the Bt63 billion in development funding is going to exacerbate the problem, not solve it. The real questions are who will spend those funds and how they will be spent? As it stands now, the military’s Internal Security Operations Command will be responsible for the disbursement of most of the funds. The civilian-led Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre only administers a handful of projects for education and reconciliation. In short the government said that it wants a softer more-development oriented approach, but that policy is being administered by the same institution that the government seeks to diminish.

Everyone I spoke to warned that the influx might actually have the adverse effect. If funds are misappropriated – and the will be – or directed to Buddhists or Muslims that have openly sided with the government, it will further alienate the population. Since 2004, the government has gone out of its way to fiscally punish “red zones” – villages with high rates of insurgent activity; hardly an effective counter-insurgency program.

More cynically, the funds are being used to shore up the Democrat’s base. Though the south is their heartland, it is really the upper south. They have been losing their share of the vote since 1996, especially in the three Muslim provinces. With elections that must be held in 2011, and the democrats likely to suffer in the north and northeast despite a slew of populist policies, dominating the south is a priority.